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The U.S. corporate sector is an enormous capital
importer. Regrettably, American federal tax law sub-
stantially encourages these financial inflows to be
structured as portfolio holdings of U.S, corporate debt
rather than as investments in U.S. corporate shares.'
Part of this syst mic bias results from the fact that
corporate interest paym nts are usually deductible
under the federal income tax but dividend distribu-
tions are not. Thus, interest payments do not bear the
U.S. corporate income tax, while dividends must be
distributed out of corporate r ceipts, which have been
sUbJe~ted to a 34·percent lax. However, another major
contnbutor to the bias in favor of portfolio debt' is the
U.S: decision in 1984 to statutorily drop the withhold-
Ing tax rate to zero on interest (including original issue
discount) received by foreigners with respect to their
portfolto holdings of American corporate debt.' In con-
trast, gross dividends paid to foreigners on U.S.
portfoho stock' investments are subject to a 30-percent
,
a dl~epartment of the Treasury, "Integration or the Individual
7~ 19~rporate.Tax Systems. Taxing Business LncomcOnce," 49,
\ 2) (heremafter cited as "Treasury Integration Report").
fOlio~hen used in this paper with respect to debt, the term "port-
by a tr~~a.ns corporate debt that is held as a passive investment
Orb Itlonal unrelated Investor as opposed to a loan by a bank
'sya substantial shareholder of the debtor.. ecu
Intern II~ns 871(h) and 881 (e). All statutory references are to the
4 a evenus COde of 1986.
fOlio':'!hcn used in this paper with respect to stock the term "port-
iSsuer,~ean.s stock that rcpres(!nt~ such a small p~rcentage of the
OVerth ~otmg shares that the Owner has no meaningful influence
X.2.(<ll.e ISSuer. COlllpnr(' Unitl'd Slatcs..canada Income Tax Treaty
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statutory withholding rate,' which is usually reduced
to 15 percent in bilateral treaties.s
Foreign investors presumably respond to these fac-
tors by substituting portfolio investments in U.S. cor-
porate debt for purchases of portfolio equity.' To the
extent that foreigners behave in this way,' U.S. corpora-
tions are more leveraged than they would otherwise
be,' and the federal income tax base is eroded by inter-
est payments that bear a zero tax rate both at the cor-
'Sections 871(0)(1) and 881(0)(1).
6See, e.g., United States-Canada Income Tax Treaty X.2.(b). Fur-
thermore, a 15~percent treaty withholding rate on dividends ap-
pears to be an international standard. ALl Federal Income Tax
Project, Tentative Draft No. 16, United States Income Tax Treaties
184 (1991) (hereinafter cited as "ALI Tax Treaty Report").
"Poreign banks borrow funds and relend them to U.S. corpora-
tions, thus incurring substantial interest costs that arguably make
a 3D-percent or IS-percent withholding tax on gross interest an
inappropriate levy. However, therewould appear to be no difference
between the costs of investors in portfolio debt and investors in
portfolio shares. See notes 2 and 4. Thus, the dramatically more
generous tax regime for portfolio debt investments creates a clear
preference for such investments over corporate share purchases.
'Some foreigners continue to buy corporate shares in the face
of these facts. Treasury Integration Report 49. These investors are
given a structural incentive to pur~hase ~rowth.stocks inst~ad of
dividend-paying shares because capital gall1s realized .by foreigners
on stock sales are usually exempt from U.S. tax. Section 871 (a)(2);
Trees Reg section 1.1441-2(a)(3); 1 Joseph lsenbergh, IJltemotiollaj
Taxation 238 (1990). As a result of this treatment of capital gains,
foreign investors in U.S. growth stocks ~ancreate a tax-free cash
flow by periodically selling pa.rt of their shares. T~ this extent,
portfolio stock investments receive tax treatment equlva lent t? the
lax treatment of portfolio debt inveSlm~nts. H.owever, there IS no
reason for such a dramatic structural bias agamst shares that pay
regular dividends. Furthermore, market condi~ions an.d investor
objectives will make growth stocks unattrach~e at times, thus
effectively limiting foreign investors to a choice between debt
instruments and dividend-paying shares.
"The increased corporate debt burden resulting from the in~o~e
tax s stem's preference of corporate debt ov~r corporate eqU!ty IS
id r regarded as distorted investor behavior that results III an
wffl. ~ Y loss c,.,> Treasury Integration Report 115-16;ALI Federal
elclCllCY .Jl ·N 21 R t'Income Tax Project, Tax Advisory Group Draft 0: ' epor er,s
Stud 34.37 (1992); ALI Federal Income Tax Pn)Ject, Reporter s
Stud~ Draft, Subchapter C (Supplemental Study 39-40 (1989).
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porate payor level and in the hands of the foreign
investor.
The bias described above could be mitigated by dis-
allowing any ded uction for U.S. corporate interest pay-
ments on foreign-held portfolio debt. This would ex-
pand the current section 163(j) treatment of tax-exempt
interest payments to foreign related parties by over-
leveraged U.S. corporations." However, even after in-
terest deduction disallowance, a significant structural
bias in favor of foreign-held debt would still remain
because the foreign distributees of dividends on Ll.S.
portfolio equity would face a 30- or 15-percent U.S.
withholding tax whereas the foreign recipients of in-
terest on U.S. portfolio debt would pay no u.s. tax.
The federal income tax base is eroded
by interest payments that bear a zero
tax rate both at the corporate payor
level and in the hands of the foreign
investor.
This latter bias against dividends could obviously
be overcome by imposing an appropriate Withholding
tax on outbound interest payments. Unfortunately,
when the Federal Republic of Germany did so in 1989,
the access of German borrowers to international capital
markets was substantially curtailed and the withhold-
ing tax was promptly repealed. IIThe world of interna-
tional finance has evolved to a competitive standard of
zero withholding on portfolio interest and any contrary
unilateral move by the U.S. would presumably cause
'''H thiowever, IS approach would mean that deductible cor-
porate Interest payments to U.s. debtholders would be taxed at
the debtholder's ~~rginal rate whereas nondeductible payments
of tax-free portfolio Interest to foreign debtholders would be taxed
at the corporate debtor's marginal rate. This is not an attractive
outcome. Furthermore, foreigners would respond by making
loans to noncorporare U.s. taxpayers who would rvlend the
money to U.S. corp?rations. ThL' compl('xities of a look through
rule would be required to combat this tactic. Compare the U.S,
Tr('~sury's recent Comprehensive Business Income Tax proposal,
which ~,youJdgenerally make all corporate interest payments non-
dcductfblc but tax-free. Treasury Integration Report 40-.n 48.4980. . , ,
"ALI Tax Treaty Report 194 n,515.
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the German experience to be replicated. Stated dif-
ferently, it does not seem feasible to address the tax :'
system's bias in favor of foreign-held U.S. corporate
debt by imposing a withholding tax on outbound in-
terest payments."
An alternative is to negotiate with our treaty part-
ners to reciprocally reduce the withholding rate on
portfolio dividends to zero." Outbound portfolio inter-
est and dividends would then receive identical with-
holding tax treatment. This would, of course, result in
a loss of the current 30- or IS-percent dividend with-
holding tax revenue. However, U.S. equity investments
would be more attractive, and even if interest pay-
ments remained fully deductible, every foreign inves-
tor who switched from U.S. corporate debt to U.S. equi-
ty would be switching from an investment that bears
a zero tax rate at the corporate level to an investment
that bears a 34-percent corporate-level tax. Thus, an
ameliorating revenue pickup would occur." Further-
more, if disallowance of the deduction for corporate
interest payments on foreign-held Ll.S. corporate debt
were implemented I; at the same time as the proposal
for negotiating zero dividend withholding in bilateral
tax treaties, the loss of dividend withholding revenue
would be at least partially paid for by the revenue gain
from the new 34-percent corporate level tax on funds
used to make outbound interest payments." It would
indeed be useful for econometricians to estimate the
effects of these revenue losses and gains to determine
the extent to which bilateral treaty reductions of the
dividend withholding rate to zero would impose a ~
revenue cost on the income tax system. ~
1,2 See ALI Tax Treaty Report 194-95; Staff of Joint Comm. on
Tax.n.' Genera.1 Explanation of the Revenue Provisions of the
Defjl;lt ~eductlon Act o~ 1984, 391-92 (Comm. Print 1984).
. While the followmg analysis might support the Ll.S."
unilateral abandonment of ~ividend Withholding, it seems better
for t~e ~.s. to extract reciprocal concessions through bilateral
negotiations. See gellerally Treasury Integration Report 48-49 79-
80; ALI Tax Treaty Report 184. '
, I~This i~ n.ot to assert ,that the revenue pickup would be suffi-
ctent to eh~·\lnate the WIthholding tax loss or to produce a net
revenue gam The suggest·· I h
I'· . '.. ton IS mere y t at the revenue loss frome trrunatmg dividend withh ldi I
'. 0 mg wou d be lessoned by an off-setting gam For a more d t iled I .
Re ., 101.·AI cal ,---u ana YSIS, see Treasury Integration
pOI :;l, an J. Auerbach "Co 'R .centives and Opt' fe' rpora e estructuring: Tax In-
665-66 (1990). Ions or orporate Tax Reform," -l3 Tnx Lm:l'. 663,
1513/11 set' note 10.
I"See note 14.
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